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INFO LOG-00 AF-01 ARA-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 TRSE-00 T-00 SS-00 USIE-00 SA-01 PMB-00 /045W

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6612
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002161

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: UN REACTS TO PDD-25

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY: THERE WAS A WIDE-RANGING AND OPEN DISCUSSION BETWEEN USUN AND MANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS FROM THE UN ON PDD-25 ON MAY 18. WHILE MANY OFFICIALS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PAST US ASSISTANCE AND APPLAUDED VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE NONPAPER ON US POLICY TOWARD NULTILATERAL OPERATIONS, A GREAT MANY QUESTIONS FOCUSSED ON THE CRITERIA FOR US APPROVAL OF, AND POSSIBLE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 USUN N 02161 01 OF 03 210200Z PARTICIPATION IN, AN OPERATION, REVEALING A FEAR THAT THE US CRITERIA WOULD TRANSLATE INTO THE SLOWING OF THE APPROVAL PROCESS OR EVEN A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF APPROVALS OF OPERATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 18 USUN AND UN OFFICIALS MET TO DISCUSS				
THE NONPAPER ON "US VIEWS ON IMPROVING UN PEACE				
OPERATIONS." THERE WERE ROUGHLY 40 UN OFFICIALS IN				
ATTENDANCE, INCLUDING				
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THE HEAD OF THE UN

SITUATION ROOM, AND OTHERS FROM LEGAL, HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, DPKO, DPA, AND FOD. AMONG THOSE FROM USUN WERE AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, COL. CLONTZ (MSC), JOHN BLANEY (ECOSOC), MICHAEL SHEEHAN (POLMIL), AND LINDA SHENWICK (RM). THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE MEETING, AS STATED BY AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH, WAS TO ALLOW UN OFFICIALS TO RESPOND TO THE NONPAPER, TO CONVEY THESE CONCERNS TO WASHINGTON, AND THEN TO ESTABLISH SMALLER WORKING GROUPS THAT WOULD DEVELOP SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE NONPAPER.

ON CRITERIA FOR APPROVING AN OPERATION

4. MANY UN OFFICIALS FOCUSSED ON THE CRITERIA TO BE APPLIED BY THE US FOR APPROVING AND RENEWING A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, VOICING A GENERAL CONCERN THAT THE US'S STANDARDS WILL EITHER DELAY THE AUTHORIZATION OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IF NOT CONFIDENTIAL

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SEVERELY LIMIT THE NUMBER THAT ARE APPROVED.

ASKED WHETHER IT WAS

POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE THE ORDERLY CRITERIA

ESTABLISHED BY THE US VERSUS THE REAL POLITICAL

PRESSURES - INCLUDING THE IMAGES PRESENTED BY CNN THAT ARE FACED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE

SECRETARIAT.

EMPHASIZING THAT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE EVALUATED ACCORDING TO THE CUMULATIVE WEIGHT OF THESE VARIOUS CRITERIA AND ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH SAID THAT THE US AND UNSC DECISION TO APPROVE SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THESE FACTORS. NOT ONLY DID THE UNSC PRESIDENT ADOPT THESE BASIC CRITERIA IN HIS MAY 3 STATEMENT. BUT SOME STANDARDS ARE NEEDED TO GUIDE THE DECISION TO APPROVE AN OPERATION - OTHERWISE THE UN WILL BE IN A POSITION OF TRYING TO DO TOO MUCH WITH TOO LITTLE. SHEEHAN ADDED THAT THE ESTABLISHED CRITERIA SHOULD ALLOW THE UN TO WITHSTAND THE PRESSURE FROM CNN AND THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF PREMATURELY ENTERING INTO THEATRES FOR WHICH IT IS NOT PREPARED.

6. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE LEGAL OFFICE ASKED WHETHER THESE SUNSET PROVISIONS ARE REALISTIC. INDERFURTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN CONGRESS ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SUNSET PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN APPLIED TO HUMANITARIAN SITUATIONS LIKE RWANDA, AND THAT THIS TOO WOULD HAVE TO BE WEIGHED ON A CASE-BY-CASE CONFIDENTIAL

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7. SAID THAT HE WAS DISTURBED BY THE
INCREASING MICRO MANAGEMENT BY THE UNSC. IN PAST
YEARS, HE OBSERVED, THE SECRETARIAT HAD MUCH
AUTONOMY, "DO IT DAG'S WAY," BUT NOW THE UNSC IS
INVOLVED IN EVERY DETAIL AND IS MICROMANAGING THESE
OPERATIONS. WE ARE IN DANGER OF CREATING AN
IMBALANCE IN THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNSC AND THE SECRETARIAT, HE CONCLUDED. NOTING
THAT THIS INCREASE ROLE OF THE UNSC IS A DIRECT
REFLECTION OF THE UN'S INCREASED ACTIVITY IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDERFURTH SAID THAT HE
HOPED THAT THE PROP
OSALS CONTAINED IN THE NONPAPER
ARE A SERVICE TO THE UN AND OFFER A WAY OF MAKING
IT MORE EFFECTIVE.

INDERFURTH STRESSED THAT THE US WILL HAVE TO WEIGH THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE ON WHETHER IT HAS A VESTED INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME, AND THAT THE US FOIA B6

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RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHEN

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THE SIT ROOM'S

THE US WILL PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION.

BASIS.

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	L-01	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6613

INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002161

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, UNSC

SUBJECT: UN REACTS TO PDD-25

RESERVES THE RIGHT TO ACT EITHER UNILATERALLY OR THROUGH AN AD HOC ARRANGEMENT SUCH AS IN DESERT STORM.

PAISED THE ISSUE OF WHAT SORT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WERE REQUIRED FOR US PARTICIPATION. HER UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE US WILL RETAIN "COMMAND" OVER ITS FORCES, THAT IS, THE RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AS IT SEES FIT, BUT THAT "OPERATIONAL CONTROL" WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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BE GIVEN TO THE UN. COL. CLONTZ SAID THAT THIS WAS
THE BASIC AND IMPORTANT DISTINCTION, AND THAT THE
US AGREES WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF UNITY OF COMMAND.
THE US WILL ONLY PLACE ITS TROOPS IN AN OPERATION
IF IT CAN AGREE TO THE CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, HE
ADDED. QUICKLY ADDED THAT THIS
REPRESENTED A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN HIS OPINION,
SUGGESTING A FEAR THAT THE US MIGHT OUTRIGHTLY
REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATING IN ANY
FUTURE OPERATIONS.

10. MANY UN OFFICIALS ALSO RAISED THE DILEMMA THAT MANY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WERE OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE AND THEREFORE REQUIRED QUICK AND PROMPT UN ACTION; HOWEVER, THE UNSC WAS GENERALLY TOO SLOW TO RESPOND TO THESE EMERGENCIES, AND THE US'S CRITERIA MIGHT REPRESENT ANOTHER OBSTACLE TO EXPEDITIOUS ACTION. BLANEY RESPONDED THAT US WAS PROPOSING VARIOUS MECHANISMS FOR STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DPKO AND DHA, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD. | CONTRIBUTED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO BLAME UNSC DELIBERATIONS FOR THE DELAYS IN GETTING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. THE PROBLEM, HE EMPHASIZED, WAS THE LACK OF POLITICAL WILL BY AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MEMBER STATES TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS. THIS WAS CLEAR IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, HE CONCLUDED.

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ASKED HOW PD-25 WOULD AFFECT THE PEACEKEEPING SUPPORT ACCOUNT, AND HOW THE US INTENDED TO PAY FOR THESE PROPOSALS SINCE THE UN IS UNDER TIGHT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS.

INDERFURTH NOTED THAT MANY OF THESE PROPOSALS ARE EITHER NOT COSTLY OR MIGHT BE ASSISTED BY THE US ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE BASIS (AS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST). CONCERNING THE USE OF THE SUPPORT FUND FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, SHENWICK SAID THAT BOTH THE UN AND THE US HAD THE SAME GOAL - STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS - BUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT MONEY THAT IS USED FROM THE SUPPORT FUND BE CHANNELLED TO LEGITIMATE PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND NOT FOR NON-RELATED SERVICES.

12. IDENTIFIED VARIOUS FINANCIAL ELEMENTS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS THAT NEEDED REFORM: AN INCREASE IN THE RESERVE FUND; A FAST-TRACK COMMITMENT IN THE FIFTH COMMITTEE; A FAST-TRACK COMMITMENT IN ACABQ; AND GREATER INTERNAL CONTROLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY. LINDA

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SHENWICK AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE NECESSITY OF THESE VERY REFORMS, AND ADDED AND IT WAS BETTER IF THEY WERE INITIATED BY THE SECRETARIAT THAN BY A MEMBER STATE.

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13. ACKNOWLEDGED THE FOIA B6
TREMENDOUS ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE US AND THE
PENTAGON IN THE PAST, AND EMPHASIZED THAT FOD HAS
BENEFITTED MOST FROM THE TOOLS - RATHER THAN THE
ADVICE - IT HAS RECEIVED. COL. CLONTZ SAID THAT
THE US HAS ALSO BENEFITTED FROM THIS INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE, AND STANDS READY TO EXPLORE HOW OTHER
TOOLS AND LESSONS THAT THE PENTAGON HAS ACQUIRED
OVER THE YEARS MIGHT BE RELEVANT TO FOD.

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OF DEPARTMENT OF PRESS INFORMATION, CONTRIBUTED THAT HOST COUNTRY PERCEPTION IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION, AND THAT DPI MUST BE MORE FULLY INVOLVED IN THE DPKO. CAN WE ARRANGE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE US AND DPI IN THE FUTURE? INDERFURTH SAID THAT WAS VERY INTENT OF US POLICY, AND THAT THE NONPAPER RECOGNIZES THAT MORE MUST BE DONE TO STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SIDE OF PEACEKEEPING

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OPERATIONS.

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